Wednesday, June 12, 2013

Enhanced Drivers Licenses

I had two similar conversations in social settings with very educated and intelligent people. I saw two metal wallets and one person said they put a piece of Scotch tape over the barcode on their drivers license. What is going on here? People believe 1) their ID cards are subject to roaming sensors 2) that could transmit personal information 3) that could cause identify theft or other harm. Given the high degree of paranoia over government supervisions and personal liberties, I decided to look into drivers licenses to determine truths from misconceptions.

According to the Department of Homeland Security the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires US citizens to present an approved form of ID to re-enter the US from Canada or Mexico. Referred to as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, which went into effect in 2007 for air travel and in 2009 for land travel, the goal is strengthening order security using standard documents to increase screening efficiency. Of course, technology emerged as an improvement over the historically paper-driven processes. From what I can gather from the DHS website, the forms of ID that are currently enabled with radio frequency identification (RFID) technology are U.S. Passport Cards (not a traditional passport, a land border transit card that cannot be used for airport travel), Trusted Traveler Program cards (Global Entry, NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST), Enhanced Driver's Licenses from Michigan, New York, Vermont and Washington, Border Crossing Cards (travel visa), and Permanent Resident Cards (green card). Out of this list of IDs, presumably only enhanced drivers licenses are of interest for most people and presumably this only applies to the four states listed by the federal agency website as offering the enhanced cards. Each of the four states requires additional fees paid to attain the enhanced license:
In no instance could I locate where a state drivers license is automatically enhanced with radio frequency technology. In each case where such an ID was offered by the state, the driver applied specifically to have this form of ID, paying a premium to attain the ability to eliminate the need for a passport when crossing the border with Canada.

Assuming someone had an enhanced license, the radio signal can register from 10-15 feet away as homeland security describes it:
...RFID-enabled document can be securely and accurately read by authorized readers from between 10 and 15 feet away, as a traveler approaches inspection lanes at the border. As the RFID chip is read, it signals a database to display biographical information, a photo, and the results of terrorist/criminal checks to the CBP officer as the vehicle pulls up to the inspection booth. No personal information is stored on or transmitted from the card – only a number which points to the information housed in the secure database – meeting the most stringent requirements for safeguarding personal data. While RFID technology expedites cross-border traffic, it does NOT replace face-to-face interactions between officers and travelers. Instead, it allows officers to focus even greater time and attention on each individual in a vehicle in order to verify that they are the rightful holder of the document presented.
So, the technology performs as designed, to enable quicker transactions at the border for the people that paid the fees to facilitate quicker border crossing with fewer documents required. What is stored on the license is a unique identifier that signals the border agent systems to which record in the database to retrieve. The photo, name and address information - while printed on the card - are not embedded in the electronic data exchange.

Assuming a rogue radio sensor picked up the signal and was able to decipher the unique identifier embedded in the enhanced license, there could not be a feasible use without the corresponding database information. Of course if someone already had access to the database information the number of the enhanced license would be redundant and not necessary for that use. The number alone is not a risky bit of information even if captured.

Should someone manage to harvest the name, address, photo, and citizenship status, what could they do with these pieces of information? Putting aside the frequency which individuals freely post this information about themselves publicly on Facebook and other social media, and reams of freely available data from those openly available sites or from town/county clerks, identity theft can unfortunately create problems. The FTC offers tips about identity theft, which split between crimes done using another person's name to credit fraud. The predominant forms of identity theft rely on using passwords to exploits lines of credit or using social security numbers to create new lines of credit - virtually stealing and destroying credit ratings. Literal impersonation is exceptionally the case compared to the fraud committed against bank accounts and credit cards. Just as finding a lost drivers licenses on the sidewalk does not open the doorway to using someone's financial instruments, neither would the database records confer direct access. In Medicare fraud, social security and other numbers are required, none of which link from the driver license number. Nor could a drivers license alone be the basis for filing a false tax refund request. There are less likely but real threats, including modification of the ID information or use of the ID to create new accounts or commit other crimes. These are not trivial risks, but could be remedied if implemented.

Going back to the line of thinking that created metal wallets:
1) ID cards are subject to roaming sensors: yes, if you paid for the specific IDs that do this
2) that could transmit personal information: no, only a numeric identifier transmits
3) that could cause identify theft or other harm: unrelated threat to the numeric identifier and unlikely threat

The concept of paying for a single license that serves as both a drivers license and a passport for land border crossings seems more efficient and less costly that two separate forms of ID. If I crossed the Canadian border often I would want an enhanced drivers license. The risks seems misconceived and negligible threats to identity. Neither a metallic wallet nor Scotch tape would offer identity protection as these miss the mark for the slim threats present. Having a license is no more of a risk now than it has been for the decades since they became commonplace.

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